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This paper analyzes the relations between the ontogenesis of social representations (SR) of 
justice and the individual’s conceptualization activity. A study was carried out with 216 
children and adolescents from Buenos Aires, Argentina, aged between 6 and 17 years old, 
with different socioeconomic backgrounds. The instrument used for data collection was an 
interview, in search for participants’ narratives about justice in their everyday life. In the 
responses of the interviewees three representations of justice could be distinguished: 
utilitarian, retributive and distributive. Approximately from 9-10 years old onward, these 
basic representations become intertwined with each other by a dialectical movement of 
integration and differentiation, which is an expression of a developmental process. It is 
concluded that the conceptualization process, within the ontogenesis of SR of justice, 
implies the construction of novelties under social and cognitive constraints that enable the 
construction of specific meanings about this social object an disable other possible 
meanings.  
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THE ONTOGENESIS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION OF JUSTICE: PERSONAL 
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
The notion of justice does not have a univocal meaning. Its polysemy that initially was pointed 
out by Aristotle (1970), is still present in debates on Ethics. Nowadays, it’s impossible to 
establish an unique definition of what justice means, since this notion only acquires full sense 
when it is utilized as an adjective, referring to something or someone considered to be just or 
unjust (Bobbio, Matteucci & Pasquino, 2005). Thus, different ways of understanding justice 
coexist and correspond to different ideologies of various social orientations (e.g. socialism, 
feminism, and liberalism). Those appeal to justice to legitimize their interests and criticize the 
existing power relations in confronting other social groups (Campbell, 2001; Camps, 2008; 
Gargarela, 1999). Despite the pluralism of meanings of justice, in everyday life people use a 
specific meaning. This regulates their social interaction and communication, depending on the 
individual engagements to an ideology, ontology, and to a particular group membership 
(Moscovici, 1961).   
According to Social Representations (SR) Theory, social groups organize their 
environment by a meaning-making process. Hence one specific object can acquire different 
meanings depending on the whole interactive social situation (Moscovici 1961; 2001a). In 
Moscovici’s (1961) definition, SR are systems of values, ideas and practices. Their main function 
is establishing a code of social exchange in the dialogical interaction between the members of a 
community. They refer to a practical knowledge that links individuals to objects in a triple sense 
(Jodelet, 1986). Firstly, SR emerge from dialogical interactions framed by specific institutions. 
Secondly, they are constructed in everyday social practices, when new meanings become 
necessary for coping with unexpected contextual demands. Thirdly, they are used by individuals 
to react to other society members or to adjust their behavior to social expectations or situational 
requirements. SR emerge in everyday interactions and are determined neither by clear 
perceptions nor by rational inferences, but by the meanings individuals and groups give to 
phenomena (Moscovici, 2001b; Jodelet, 1989). In other words, SR do not refer to real objects or 
phenomena but to socially shared constructions, and that way there are many realities (Marková, 
2012).  
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Therefore the epistemic force of such representations arises from the strength of people’s 
beliefs in them and from the efficacy they have in group communication (Marková, 2000; 2003). 
The continuous adjustments and negotiations that occur in social relations involve the 
development of shared meanings that function as action patterns. Such collectively constructed 
meanings do not depend on the effect that persons have on others, since they depend on the 
system that frames their interactions (Moscovici, 1988). Individuals live in a symbolical order 
that is taken for granted because they were born in it. They consider it as the natural world that is 
only questioned when something unexpected happens and a new meaning making process is 
necessary to reestablish the balance with the environment (Duveen, 2007; Moscovici, 2001b). As 
Wagner and Hayes (2005) pointed out: “Common sense is our spontaneously available 
background knowledge. It is largely used without thinking, and is subject to our everyday 
practice” (p.18). 
On a psychological level of analysis (Doise, 1982), SR guide the meaning-making process 
about objects and actions related to them, since they are semiotic mediating devices with a pre-
adaptational function to the future (Valsiner, 2003). Indeed, those social mediational resources 
available in particular contexts constrain the semiotic construction in the irreversibility of time, 
stabilizing past-future movements. “As structured semiotic mediators, social representations are 
multi-level meaning complex, which are constantly in the process of innovation, created in and 
through conflict and tension” (Valsiner, 2003, p.7.3). In other words, SR limit the range of 
available meanings for one object, in turn determining possible behaviors regarding it.  
It is important to understand the relation between the ontogenesis of social representations 
and the person’s conceptualization. Individuals become social actors during socialization, but this 
is a process of construction and re-construction in which novelty emerges, that is, the 
development of new understandings about the objects as well as transformation in psychological 
structures (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). SR theory is a constructivist theory based on the relational 
interaction between subject and representational object. Both are co-constructed in a 
developmental process: “from this perspective the world which is known is the product of the set 
of socio-psychological structures through which it has been constructed” (Duveen, 2002, p. 140). 
However, there’s only novelty for the actor, as a construction of a new understanding of his 
world, and not for his culture or social group (Duveen, 2007). Socialization, understood as a 
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process that enables novelties, requires the study of the relation between the appropriation and the 
conceptualization of SR, as well as the social and psychological constraints on these processes.  
 
SOCIAL REPRESENTATION’S ONTOGENESIS: A DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 
 
SR can be described as genetic structures, because they result from developmental processes 
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Three different analytical levels in SR transformation process can be 
distionguished: sociogenesis, microgenesis, and ontogenesis. The latter refers specifically to the 
process by which individuals –not only children- appropriate their group’s cultural knowledge in 
order to become social actors (Duveen & De Rosa, 1992). In Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) words, 
“a process through which individuals re-construct social representations and in doing so they 
elaborate particular social identities” (p. 7). 
There are few empirical studies focusing on the appropriation of SR during childhood. An 
explanation to this lack of research in social psychology might be found in Moscovici’s (1990) 
view on the particular scopes of social and developmental psychology. According to his proposal, 
the social nature of the conformation of human conscience needs to by explained. However, it 
must be studied through the comprehension of the individual internalization of social experience. 
In the course of this internalization process it is possible to distinguish moments and specific 
operations through which the different consciences are articulated with each other and with 
culture. Although Moscovici (1990) emphasizes this developmental process, he suggests that it is 
outside social psychology’s main focus, as it is the object of study of developmental psychology. 
Nevertheless, Duveen (1994) points out that the challenge is for a social psychologist to 
adopt a developmental perspective about the genesis of social representation, and for a 
developmental psychologist to explain how children become social actors. In other words, both 
disciplines study the same phenomena, but developmental psychology uses an individual 
perspective whereas the social psychology applies a collective or societal perspective (Doise, 
1982). Even though research would be enhanced by complementing both perspectives, this has 
been the exception rather than the rule (e.g. Barreiro, 2009, 2012; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990; Leman 
& Duveen, 1996; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; Psaltis,  Duveen & Perret-Clermont, 2009) 
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Developmental psychology has a long tradition of studying the psychogenetic process of 
the notion of justice, starting with Piaget’s (1932) research about children’s moral judgment. This 
empirical research indicates that individuals have to get over moral heteronomy, based on 
obedience to adults and group traditions, in order to develop moral autonomy. As a consequence 
he considers distributive justice as the most rational moral notion. It represents the end point of 
moral development, since it is based on reciprocity, one of the main properties of operational 
thought.  
In Piaget’s theory moral development is conceived as a non-stop development from less 
to more equilibrium in the stages of thought, because rationality is seen as the ideal equilibrium 
(Marková, 2012; Psaltis, Duveen & Perret-Clermont, 2009; Faigenbaum, Castorina, Helman & 
Clemente, 2003). This process is never completed, as people remain heteronomous depending on 
the social relation that they are involved in (Piaget, 1932, 1965). Piaget’s (1965) sociological 
perspective rejects the split between individual and society. It considers that social interactions 
are not separable from individual actions (Castorina, 2010). In discussing Durkheim’s (2002) 
assumptions about moral development, Piaget (1932) establishes a differentiation within the 
relational system that constitutes society. He distinguishes relations of constraint and 
cooperation, that is, between symmetrical and asymmetrical relations in terms of power 
distribution. These two types of social relations allow different forms of understanding. 
Constraint relations establish an atmosphere of obedience to authority legitimized by existing 
social structures. Therefore individual judgments that are constructed within their frame are based 
on social influence and compliance. In cooperative relations children’s judgments are based on 
consensus with peers, thus allowing forms of conversion or innovation (Duveen, 2002). Peer 
interactions not only result in a cognitive decentration from a subjective viewpoint but can also 
modify the structure of social relations. They enable the development of autonomous individuals 
aware of their own self and their role in society, thus making a more egalitarian society possible.   
Researchers who continued Piaget’s work did not take into account his differentiation 
between types of social relations and their effects on moral development. Their work about the 
notion of justice is based on the assumption of an isomorphism between the development of 
operational thought and justice conceptions (Damon, 1975, 1977, 1990; Kohlberg, 1976; 1981; 
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Thorkildsen, 1991), without considering commons sense knowledge, because it responds to 
“irrational” logic. 
It is well known that in Piagetian theory the different logical and mathematical notions, 
constructed by individuals in the course of their cognitive development, indicate the existence of 
specific thought structures (Piaget & Inhelder, 1941). Therefore, researchers of moral 
development presented problematic situations to children and asked them to figure out a solution 
that would manifest operational thought (Damon, 1990; Kohlberg, 1976; Thorkildsen, 1991). 
They analyzed the criteria that individuals used to solve such situations, as they were not moral 
but logical problems, without considering how subjects think and experience justice in their 
everyday life. 
One of the most important critiques of these studies is that the presented problems were 
far removed from a person’s moral experience. Also the simplistic understanding of thought in 
moral development was criticized, since it only considered the development of operational 
thought as correlative to the achievement of an ethic of principles (Emler, 1982; Tarry & Emler, 
2007; Flanagan 1996; Haidt, 2008; Hauser, 2006, Shweder & Much, 1987). In this line, a group 
of social psychologists (Darly & Pittman, 2003; Hogan & Emler, 1981) pointed out that 
modernity’s ideals about liberty and equality lead developmental psychologist to underestimate 
the importance of retributive justice in everyday interactions. People need the members of their 
social groups to respect norms; otherwise their world will become unpredictable.  
Apart from the mentioned critiques it should also be noted that the assumption about 
progressive rationality in moral judgments is in contradiction with empirical findings about the 
development of social domain knowledge. These results show that different forms of thought, 
that had been conceptualized as childish, stick around in adults constituting a state of cognitive 
polyphasia (Jovchelovitch, 2006; Moscovici, 1961; Wagner, Duveen, Verma, & Themel, 2006). 
According to SR theory thought does not necessarily progress from a naïve to an expert point of 
view, from pre-logic to logic forms, but the different types of thinking coexist. In everyday life 
there are contradictory cultural meanings that, when using, sustaining, or appropriating them, 
reveal different logics or thought systems. The cognitive polyphasia thesis proposes that there is 
an adequacy in the relationship between different situations and different logics of thinking. Such 
coexistence enables the same person to give different meanings to the same phenomenon, 
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corresponding to different -even contradictory- beliefs and values that have been established by 
his or her social groups during collective and historical experiences (Duveen, 2007; Marková, 
2012). 
 
HOW IS JUSTICE REPRESENTED BY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN 
EVERYDAY SITUATIONS ? 
 
A study was carried out with a convenience sample of children and adolescents (N=216) from 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Subjects were between 6 and 17 years old (18 participants for each age 
group), 48% were female and 52% were male. The distribution of the sample according to family 
educational level was: 34% primary studies, 22% secondary studies, and 34% university studies. 
All children attend public schools in different urban areas of the city. According to recent studies 
both people from Buenos Aires and the most widely read newspaper in Argentina represent 
justice hegemonically (Moscovici, 1988), based on a retributive meaning. The most important 
newspaper of the country mentions justice mainly in an institutional sense with a negative 
valorization, demanding harder penalties to fight the increase of crime that places the population 
in a continuous position of so called "insecurity" (Barreiro, et al., in press). The same 
representation could be found in young people and adolescents, since they associate the term 
“justice” to laws, trials, delinquency, judges and impunity (Barreiro, et al., in press; Morais 
Shimizu & Stefano Menin, 2004).  
For data collection 10 minutes individual interviews were performed according to the 
Piagetian méthode clinique (Delval, 2001; Duveen & Gilligan, 2013; Honey, 1987; Piaget, 1926). 
The previously established interventions of the interviewer were: 1) Please tell me something that 
has to do with justice that happened to you, or that you have seen, heard or whatever. And after 
the participants constructed a narrative in answer to this question, the interviewer asked 2): Why 
do you think that this situation was just (or unjust, depending on the narrative constructed by the 
participant)? Then, the interviewer would formulate all the necessary questions to understand the 
participant’s justifications.  
It was decided to use this methodological approach for two mean reasons. On the one 
hand, this research attempts to study the representation of justice as it is experienced by children 
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and adolescents in their everyday life. The personal experience constitutes a root to analyze the 
developing relation between the individual and social environment (Hedegaard, 2012; Hviid, 
2012). The individual participating in this research may have narrated about a situation that did 
not involve them directly, but all situations described had affective and cognitive connotations for 
them, because their cultural moral order is expressed (Miller, 2006; Shweder & Munch, 1987). 
For example, if they learned from the news on television that a criminal got out of prison and 
decided to take this situation as an example of injustice, they had been affected at some point by 
it, reflecting the presence of justice in their social environments. On the other hand, this 
methodological strategy ruled out spontaneous associations about justice, similar to the data 
collection technique most used by social psychologies to study SR: the word association method 
(Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Indeed, this non reflexive strategy is complemented in this study by the 
argumentative process enabled by the dialogical structure of the interview. This way, analyzing 
the arguments the interviewees expressed by answering questions about the meaning of justice in 
the situations they decided to narrate a hypothesis can be elaborated about their thinking 
coherence. This is the main purpose of developmental psychology from a Piagetian perspective 
(Killen & Smetana, 2007).  
Moreover, the interviewees’ arguments constituted a way to grasp the level of ownership 
of such representations that could be present in the discourse (Tappan, 2005, 2006; Wertsch, 
1998). Wertsch (1998) explains the cognitive processes through which individuals appropriate 
the cultural mediation tools (ideology, values, social representations, etc.). One dimension of this 
process consists of the mastering of the object by the agent. This is understood as a “knowing-
how” competence to use a mediating tool with a relatively high degree of expertise.  The second 
dimension of this process refers to a sense of “ownership”, that is, how an agent takes a cultural 
tool that belongs to others and makes it his or her own. In many cases, levels of mastering 
coincide with levels of ownership. Nevertheless, it can also happen that a high mastering level 
does not correspond with a similar level of ownership. The agent can use the tool without 
considering it as his or her own, so that it remains in the subject as someone else’s voice, 
probably due to a feeling of conflict or resistance towards the object.  
Only 13 participants (all of them aged between 6 to 9) said they did not know what 
“justice” means and could not give any example of it. The analysis of the rest of the collected 
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data was made according to the assumption of the grounded theory recommendations to interpret 
qualitative information (Corbin & Strauss, 1998). Analyzing similarities, differences, and 
recurrences in participants’ arguments, 8 analytical categories were constructed to describe the 
different representations of justice identified. To construct the categories, the prominent positions 
in current ethical debates have been taken into account as a heuristic guide to orient the 
interpretations of participant’s narratives and to give the categories a name (Campbell, 2001). 
The validity of these analytical categories was determined by randomly selecting 24 of the 
transcribed interviews (11%; 2 from each age group) and having them tested by two independent 
expert judges. The percentage of agreement in their coding was 85%. In the following the 
categories identified will be presented, each followed by some illustrative examples.  
A) Utilitarian representation: In this category the answers included considered justice as 
“something that enables everyone to be happy”. Justice is understood in terms of “what does 
good to people”, “good” being synonymous to happiness. This is very similar to what utilitarian 
ethics postulates (Bentham, 1789/2008). According to this ethical theory, justice is the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of individuals.   
 
Victoria (6;05)
1
: Just is going to my aunt’s  house on Saturdays2. [¿And why is it 
just?]  Because I like it. 
 
Lorena (16;01): Something that an individual wants or something that we want society 
to become. [Could you give an example?] For example what is being done about 
justice influences all problems that we have, justice must be done to solve the 
problems. [¿Which problems are you referring to?] Poor people... Everything that is 
being done to make their situation better. It is unjust that nobody takes care of making 
their situation better so that all people can be well. [¿Who has to take care of them?] 
Ah… the Government and the organizations, to correct things.  
 
                                                 
1
 Indicates participants’ age in years and months. 
2
 The following notations were used in the transcripts: “[ ]” indicate interviewer’s observations and words, 
italics indicate interviewees’ words. 
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Victoria (6;05) defines justice as something that brings happiness to her while Lorena 
(16;01) considers that justice would solve social problems and assures everybody to be fine. The 
interviewees think justice as something that is good for people and enables them to live happily. 
Yet the youngest children focus their narratives only on themselves or things they like to do. Age 
9 and onward these egocentric narratives start to include a social perspective by considering 
collective or other people´s happiness and including different social settings or institutions (e.g. 
school, sports club). It seems that children from 9 to 10 years old are capable of thinking of 
justice as a social relation system that includes them. Probably this change is produced, on the 
one hand, by cognitive decentration that enables individuals to assume other perspectives or to 
understand others’ mental states (Muller & Carpendale, 2011; Perner, 1991; Piaget, 1924, 1932). 
On the other hand, it can be a result of the increase in the social world complexity related to the 
children growing up, their more frequent participation in different social situations or institutions 
with more complex organization, that allows them to include in their narratives the personal and 
social perspective (Duveen, 2013; Hviid, 2012; Piaget, 1932). There’s a permanence of utilitarian 
justice represented by a high percentage in all age groups (as a basic representation or integrated 
with the other representations). This indicates that, contrary to Piagetian assumptions (Piaget 
1926; Delval, 1994), the conception of the world as ruled by a natural order that guarantees the 
satisfaction of humanity needs will not be abandoned during the cognitive development. 
Moreover, such an order ensuring everybody’s happiness, is the most frequent meaning attributed 
to justice.  
B) Retributive representation: This category includes the answers that indicate an 
understanding of justice as a relation between actions performed or individual merits and 
punishments or rewards received. From this perspective justice is conceived in punitive terms, 
similar to Aristotle’s corrective justice (1970) or the retributive ethic represented by Kant or 
Hegel (Garland, 1999; Villacañas, 2008), since it has the function of correcting past action 
without considering the future consequences of the outcomes of that action.  
 
Daniela (8;06): For example, it is unjust if he was fired from his job for nothing. 
[And how it would be just?] It would be just if he was fired because he did 
something wrong.  
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Clearly Daniela (8:06) thinks of justice as situations in which the persons involved get 
what they deserve. In contrast, outcomes that are not deserved are unjust. Justice is understood as 
a balance between what’s deserved and what comes out. This representation tends to appear in 
narratives constructed by children from 9 years old onward, due to the necessary cognitive 
capacity to consider the social perspective and include others who administer punishment. This 
necessarily a decentration process from the own perspective to the other’s point of view. Also the 
participation in more complex social situations has been described before in relation to the 
transformations of utilitarian representation. In contrast to Piaget (1932), the retributive 
conception of justice is not the first to appear in moral development and does not disappear with 
the achievement of moral autonomy and the participation in social relations of mutual respect.  
C) Distributive Representation: This category refers to justice as a distribution based on 
the equality of norms applied to all people implicated, without any favoritism or preference. This 
is the meaning that Rawls (1971) has given to the notion of justice: fairness. 
 
Agustin (16;07): For example, when a teacher evaluates the exam results,  it is 
just because she takes the same basis to evaluate us all, almost always,  she  
applies the same criteria. For me justice is a synonym of equality, that everybody 
has the same conditions, possibilities and could get to the same point. It is unjust 
for example that some people are born with everything and others with nothing. 
Some people are very wealthy while others are very poor, I think that is unjust. 
 
Agustin’s narrative manifests the thought of justice in terms of the egalitarian treatment 
that some teachers give to their students. The opposite “injustice” refers to inequality because we 
all are equal and deserve to have the same possibilities. 
In the course of cognitive development those basic representations, that are differentiated 
in the beginning, integrate with each other to form a dialectical movement of differentiation-
integration (Piaget, 1980). The latter refers to one modality of an inferential (not deductive) 
dialectic that Piaget postulated as a cognitive instrument of psychological development. 
According to his theory about the emergency of new possible meanings of objects, the 
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development of their representation follows a movement from an initial indifferentiation of their 
features and properties to a differentiation and a final integration. This dynamic explains the 
process that allows individuals to have a more complex and abstract comprehension of the 
representational object, in this case justice. Consequently, four new categories could be 
identified: D) Utilitarian representation within a distribution situation; E) Distributive 
representation within a retribution situation; F) Utilitarian representation within a retribution 
situation; G) Utilitarian representation within a retributive distribution situation. 
D) Utilitarian representation within a distribution situation: The narrative related by 
participants was about distributions of goods, but those distributive actions were considered just 
because they were the best way to achieve happiness for all persons involved. 
 
Laura (17;01): For example, there are little children trying to buy something to eat 
at the school buffet during lunch time, and the seller can’t see them because of the 
bigger guys. So, the seller decides to organize them in a queue. [Why do you think 
that this situation is about justice?] Because she organizes all, so everybody can 
buy during lunch time. [Ok, but why do you think that to organize the queue was 
just?] Because that was good for everyone, all of us have the same chance to buy. 
Before the little children couldn’t buy food, so they are hungry all day. [Ok, I 
understand now. So, what do you think justice means?] It means that everybody 
can live happily, having the same rights and all that. 
 
E) Distributive representation within a retribution situation: The situations narrated were 
about retribution (punishment or reward), but in order to be just the retribution had to follow 
egalitarian rules for everybody involved. In other words, these narratives are about the just 
distribution of rewards and punishments, ensuring the equality between all members of a group 
of people. 
 
Florencia (14;06): When the teacher gives us the mark that we deserve in 
proportion to how much we studied [¿Why do you think that is just?] Because all 
of us have the same rights and she has to evaluate us according to how much we 
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studied. [¿What do you think justice means?] Something like what maintains, or 
better said, what controls that each one has the same rights. It is like… I don’t 
know… when you do something that is not equal for everybody… For example, a 
girl that I know received a better grade than me in an exam, but not because she 
had studied more than me, but because the teacher likes her more than me, so she 
gives her a better grade. 
 
F) Utilitarian representation within a retribution situation: The narratives described 
situations of punishment or reward, but both were conceived merely as methods to achieve 
happiness for everyone, which is the actual meaning of justice for these subjects. 
 
Juan (11;03): When you fight with a guy and he says 'No, no, no, he hit me', the 
people in charge of justice, in this case the teacher, must seek for the truth ... so 
your name will be clean while the name of the other becomes spoiled (...) [What 
do you think justice means?] Justice is a way to bring order, (....) is a way to make 
things right and people who are committed to justice try to promote good over 
evil, to make people live better. 
 
G) Utilitarian representation within a retributive distribution situation: These narratives 
presented justice as a way to live better provided that the retributive situations are governed by 
equalitarian rules for everybody relating outcomes with personal merits or behaviors.  
 
Martin (15; 07): Justice… that people have work, housing, food… I am thinking 
about politicians. They have to care about the people and not do things only under 
obligation. Here people need help and anyone notices that. The politicians should 
realize that we are people with necessities. [¿Why do you think that is just that 
people have work…?] (Interrupts) Because we are all human beings and we 
deserve a good life, with dignity. We all deserve a happy life without unnecessary 
problems. [What do you think that justice means?] It’s what protects us and makes 
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that bad people are where they have to be, and good people too. It’s unjust that 
good people have nothing and bad people, such as politicians, have everything.  
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of each category according to age. The three age groups 
have been determined considering shifts in the cognitive comprehension of the social world of 
children and adolescents (see Delval & Kohen, 2012). Different studies show that from 6 to 9 
years old children base their explanations of the social world in the more concrete and perceptible 
features of the situation. Furthermore they tend to be centered in their own experience, unable to 
consider different perspectives of the same situation. Between 10 and 13 years the subjects are 
capable of taking the difference between social, personal and institutional relations into account, 
and start to consider the invisible figures of social interactions. Finally, from 14 to 17 years old 
the inference of implicit social regulations has a major role in adolescent’s explanations about the 
social world, as they can coordinate different perspectives on the same phenomena and think 
about many possibilities to solve a social conflict.   
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Table 1: Distribution of representations according to age groups (N=216) 
 
 Representations of justice  
Total  
  
Doesn’t 
Know Utilitarian Retributive Distributive 
Utilitarian 
within 
distribution 
Distributive 
within 
retribution 
Utilitarian 
within 
retribution 
Utilitarian 
within 
distributive 
retribution 
Age 6-9 n 13 41 2 4 7 1 2 2 72 
  % 18,1% 56,9% 2,8% 5,6% 9,7% 1,4% 2,8% 2,8% 100% 
 10-13 n - 21 14 3 8 2 22 2 72 
  % - 29,2% 19,4% 4,2% 11,1% 2,8% 30,6% 2,8% 100% 
 14-17 n - 7 6 4 7 13 25 10 72 
  % - 9,7% 8,3% 5,6% 9,7% 18,1% 34,7% 13,9% 100% 
Total  n 13 69 22 11 22 16 49 14 216 
  % 6,0% 31,9% 10,2% 5,1% 10,2% 10,2% 22,7% 6,5% 100% 
According to Table 1 the utilitarian representation of justice is present in all age groups. 
The results also suggest that retributive representation increments its frequency along with age. It 
becomes the most frequent representation in the age group between 10 to 17 years old, when it is 
integrated with utilitarian representation. Justice is something that enables everyone to live happy 
and retribution is the method to achieve it. Finally, the distributive representation of justices has a 
low frequency in the different age groups compared to other representations. There are very few 
individuals who expressed this meaning of justice. Only 11 mentioned it in its basic form and 49 
mentioned it integrated with other representations. These results confront the assumption of the 
developmental psychology that distributive justice corresponds to the most rational moral 
thinking and emerges as a consequence of the access to autonomous thought (Kohlberg, 1976; 
Piaget, 1932). 
 
SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE MEANING-MEAKING 
PROCESS 
 
According to the empirical data presented before the ontogenesis of social representations of 
justice implies a developmental process, which is manifested mainly by a differentiation-
integration dialectical process of the representations (Piaget, 1980). It can be argued that the four 
integrated representations (D, E, F and G) express the development of novelties, in the sense of 
the construction of a new way to represent justice that includes and overcomes the three basic 
representations (utilitarian, retributive and distributive). Those more complex representations 
provide not only a definition of justice (e.g. justice is people living happily), but also a method to 
achieve it (e.g. administrating punishments or rewards according to personal merits). Moreover 
such integrated representations refer to a broader field of the phenomenon, since they refer to 
social systems in general or institutional functioning and involve different individual and social 
roles beyond the direct personal experience.  
Despite the fact that the three basic representations can be integrated with each other, 
none is abandoned across this developmental process, as they remain recognizable in individual’s 
narratives. In this sense, contrary to many studies about cognitive development in social domain 
(Damon, 1990; Delval, 1994; Kohlberg, 1981), the results suggest that the meaning making 
process does not occur due to a conflict between contradictory representations, but could be a 
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result of the coexistence of different meanings that are not opposite. In Piaget’s terms (1982) it 
can be considered as a dialectical movement explained as the inferential process from an already 
constructed meaning to more complex new meanings. This process is not about replacing 
previous representations that are less epistemologically valid than others closer to “reality”, or the 
“right” understanding of justice. Also, there are no criteria to establish such a judgment about the 
epistemic validity of justice representations, since justice is not a physical object with specific 
properties that can be approached by thought. Justice is a social object, which had been 
constructed and transformed in the course of a social group’s history legitimizing different social 
practices (Campbell, 2001). Moreover, as has been explained in the introduction of this paper, 
there is no consensus on the most adequate sense of justice among philosophers. 
Probably the integration-differentiation process of the justice representation ontogenesis 
occurs simultaneously to the cognitive decentration that enables subjects to include different 
social and personal perspectives in their representations about justice (at about 9-10 years old). 
Such transformation is the result of both a cognitive development and the participation of the 
children in more complex social institutions and relations, away from their parents. This is 
manifested in the different social interactions and institutions that young adolescents mention in 
their narratives about justice. The increasing complexity expresses that in the moral domain –as 
in other domains of thought- conceptualization processes move from concrete to more abstract 
(e.g., Castorina & Lenzi, 2000; Delval, 1994; Duveen 2013; Faigenbaum, 2005; Kohlberg, 1976; 
Piaget, 1924).  
In addition, considering the most frequent representation of justice in adolescents, 
retribution appears as the method to achieve social welfare. This could be explained taking into 
account the different empirical studies realized with Argentine samples. Those have revealed that 
the hegemonic SR (Moscovici, 1988) of justice has a retributive and institutional meaning 
(Morais Shimizu & Stefano Menin, 2004; Barreiro, et al., in press). What’s more, the Argentine 
press tends to diffuse retributive meanings of justice, demanding harder punishments for 
criminals to re-establish social order (Barreiro, et al., in press). Thus, it could be concluded that 
such a retributive social representation of justice is appropriated, during the socialization process, 
by children and adolescents. It is important to remark that the retributive representation of 
justices does not correlate to any specific general stage of thought development, since it is present 
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in all age groups. Rather, retributive representation is enabled by its enactment in specific 
interactions and discussions, making its particular meaning more salient than other possible 
meanings of justice.  
However, the aforementioned integration-differentiation process shows that individuals 
are active agents reconstructing the hegemonic representation in accordance with their cognitive 
possibilities. More specifically, the retributive representations of justice are not only appropriated 
by compliance in a frame of constraint relations, because they become more abstract and complex 
in relation with the participant’s age. Therefore, such hegemonic representation would not simply 
impose upon the agents by social constraints, as the agents play an active and reconstructive role 
in the appropriation process.  
From this perspective, moral judgments are not transmitted from one generation to 
another by adults, as already constructed solutions to everyday problems (Shweder & Much, 
1987; Emler, 1987; Emler & Ohana, 1993). Is it true that specific representation of justice are not 
individual constructions, they are meaning complexes constructed in the course of a historical 
meaning-making process across generations (sociogenesis) (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). 
Nevertheless, while individuals reconstruct this social knowledge during socialization something 
novel emerges (Duveen, 2007). The latter is exhibited both in the increasing complexity of the 
situations related to justice in everyday life in the participants’ narratives, and in the integration-
differentiation dialectical process. In other words, individuals reconstruct the collectively 
constructed meanings about justice to understand them, depending on their cognitive possibilities 
and their personal experiences with this object. As Duveen pointed out: “The knowledge of the 
social world is limited by the structures we have availed for apprehending it” (Duveen, 2002, p. 
141). 
Another interesting point to remark about the obtained results is the low frequency of 
distributive justice in all age groups. That seems to contradict research assuming this sort of 
justice as an expression of progressive unfolding of intellectual operations (Piaget 1932; Damon, 
1990; Kohlberg, 1976). However, this low frequency could be explained appealing to the 
collective meaning-making process. Societies not only produce active meanings about the world, 
but also absences of meaning or nothingness. In Bang’s words (2009):  
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… this absence is not a real absence but a presence of an absence. That which is 
‘not there’ and that which is ‘invisible’ are -from the present point of view- the 
relational and dynamics processes out of which meaning grow as Gestalt qualities 
which at the same time belong to individual and to the cultural and environmental 
transformation they produce. (p. 376)   
 
From this perspective the nothingness is itself a construction. Low appearance of 
distributive justice could be a way to cope - collectively and individually - with social injustice, 
as this is something particularly frightening (Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Clayton, 2011). 
Additionally, it is plausible to hypothesize that the distributive justice is an emancipated 
representation (Moscovici, 1988), resulting from the circulation of knowledge in a minority 
group, with the potentiality to challenge the retributive hegemonic representations that legitimize 
social order (Augoustinos, 1999; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). 
Summing up, the conceptualization process within the ontogenesis of SR of justice 
implies construction of novelties conditioned by two different types of constraints (Castorina & 
Faigenbaum, 2002). One of such refers to the social guidance of the person’s meaning-making 
process (Bang, 2009; Valsiner, 2003), that enables to think justice in retributive terms, disabling 
other possible meanings such as distribution. The other constraint is cognitive, because 
individuals reconstruct or understand the SR of justice according to their thought possibilities 
(Castorina, 2010; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990).  
Those dialectic relations between developmental process and social or personal 
constraints, highlight the need to carry out empirical research that considers both developmental 
and social psychology theoretical and methodological frameworks. The convergence of both 
disciplines allows studying the link between collective meaning-making processes and person’s 
conceptualization, without considering the former as Platonic abstractions and the latter as the 
result of a cognitive construction disembodied from the personal experience with social 
environment.  
Nevertheless, there is a limitation to the present study. The scope of the data collected and 
their analysis concerned only a discursive take on SR of justice. This focus on discourse and 
conversation give relevant information, but don’t consider forms to socially enact SR (Jodelet, 
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1989; Zittoun et al., 2003) and, moreover, there are zones of SR that can’t be verbally explicated 
(Flamment, Guimelly & Abric, 2006). This suggests a possible line for future research. It would 
be relevant to investigate whether the forms to enact social representations of justice are others 
forms of the social representation process involved in the ontogenesis of SR. In this vein it would 
be enriching to analyze the SR of justice in the interactions of Argentine children and adolescents 
with their families, peers, in school, etc. In other words, in “patterns of interaction or customs 
that encapsulate meanings or experiences for people” (Zittoun, et. al., p. 417). There is a different 
non-reflective use of symbolical recourses that position individuals into different forms of 
interaction with justice, like books, movies, storytelling, etc. Their study will shed new light on 
the data and conclusions presented, as they can reinforce or challenge SR of justice.  
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